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MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.
THE IDEOLOGISTS—THE TRADITIONALISTS.
BY PROFESSOR L. LEVY-BRUHL.
CONDORCET belonged to a group of philosophers who, under
the Republic, the Consulate and the Empire, upheld the spirit
and methods of the eighteenth century, and who gave themselves
the name of "ideologists." Their doctrine has generally been
judged with excessive severity. It has been represented as the tail
of Condillacism ; this philosophy, it is said, already narrow as it
came from its founder, became more and more thin and poor in the
hands of the ideologists, until it was reduced to a mere theory of
knowledge, semi-psychological and semi-logical, devoid of origi-
nality and with no hold on men's minds. This picture is very much
exaggerated ; to be convinced of this, we need only remember how
strong was Napoleon's anxiety to stop the mouths of "those ideol-
ogists." He would not have taken the trouble, had their philos-
ophy really been so insignificant.
According to Destutt de Tracy, who is, together with Cabanis,
the most noteworthy of the ideologists, we cannot know the begin-
ning of anything, neither that of men, nor that of the universe.
Questions of origin are unanswerable. What was formerly called
metaphysics is the most shallow thing in the world. Researches
on the nature of the soul or on the first principle of things are in-
evitably vain. Whether we examine the phenomena within or
without ourselves, all that we may hope to accomplish is to acquire
a deeper and deeper knowledge of the laws of nature. The proper
object of philosophy, or ideology, is to study what takes place in
us when we think, speak, or reason. It then becomes the basis of
ethics, economics, legislation and the other moral sciences.
Ideology recognizes as its founder Condillac, who first clearly
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propounded the problem of the origin of our knowledge, and pointed
out a suitable method for its solution. But from the outset, Destutt
de Tracy differs with him. He does not admit that attention is a
mere transformed sensation, and consequently rejects the whole
genesis of understanding and will as conceived by Condillac. He
propounds another theory according to which there are four facul-
ties of the soul, and only four : sensibility, memory, judgment, and
volition, which he calls four irreducible "modes of sensation."
Condillac ascribed to the active sense of touch the acquisition
of the idea of something outside ourselves. De Tracy shows the ex-
planation to be insufficient, and felicitously completes it: "When
a being organised so as to will and feel, feels within him volition
and action, and at the same time resistance against this action
willed and felt by him, he is assured of his own existence, and of
the existence of something that is not himself. Action willed and
felt on the one hand, and resistance on the other hand—these are
the links between our self and other beings, between beings that
feel and beings that are felt." Any other sensation than this, com-
mencing or terminating independently of our will, would be power-
less to give us this idea. De Tracy is here nearer to Maine de Biran
than to Condillac. In a similar way, in his Logique, De Tracy does
not admit, with Condillac, that our judgments are equations, that
our reasonings are series of equations, and that ideas compared in
a judgment or in right reasoning are identical. We must say, on
the contrary, that equations are a kind of judgment ; and even in
equations, the ideas compared together are not identical but eqtiiv-
alent.
De Tracy is a clear, sincere, and vigorous mind, holding firmly
to the principles of the eighteenth century philosophy, and not
shrinking from any consequences of these principles. The French
Revolution, to which he nearly fell a victim, did not shake his con-
victions. He will not admit that a true doctrine may be immoral
or dangerous for societ}', and claims entire liberty for philosophical
research. Even morality is concerned in this liberty. For moral
principles are not innate, whatever Voltaire may have said to the
contrary. It is a very ancient and absurd error to believe that
moral principles are in some sort injected into our heads, and the
same in every head, and to be led by this dream to attribute to
them a more celestial origin than to all other ideas which exist in
our understanding. Moral science is of our own making, as all
others are, and similarly built up of the results of our experience
and reflexion. But it is subordinate to a knowledge of human na-
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ture, and the latter in its turn "depends upon the state of physics,
of which it is but a part." So, though for his own part he made
use of a purely psychological method, De Tracy did not, in theory,
separate the moral from the natural sciences. Accordingly he said
that ideology was a part of zoology, or of animal physics, and dedi-
cated his Logiqiie to his friend Cabanis, the celebrated author of
the Rapports dii Physique et du Moral.
Cabanis has been looked upon as a materialist, but without
sufficient reason, for he purposely abstains from expressing any
metaphysical opinion. Like De Tracy, he declares that first causes
are not an object of science, not even an object of doubt, and that
on this point we are in a state of hopeless ignorance. But from an
experimental point of view, he ascertains that the brain is to thought
what the stomach is to digestion. As impressions reach the brain
they excite it to activity, just as food, when it enters the stomach,
stimulates in it a secretion of the gastric juice. The proper func-
tion of the one is to perceive each particular impression, to attach
signs to it, to combine and compare together the different impres-
sions, and to form therefrom judgments and determinations, just
as the function of the other is to act upon nutritious substances.
From this Cabanis derives the notorious formula : "The brain in
some sort digests impressions ; it produces an organic secretion of
thought ; " a comparison which may be regarded as more or less
happy, but which is meant to be nothing but a comparison.
By dint of psychological abstraction, it seemed to have been
forgotten that man is, to use Bossuet's words, a natural whole,
composed of a soul and a body. Cabanis comes back to this idea.
Being at the same time a physician and a psychologist, he shows,
by the aid of several hundred observations made upon man, both
in health and sickness, the reciprocal action of the body upon the
mind and of the mind upon the body. The physiology of Cabanis
is now quite out of date, but few have spoken better than he of the
influence of age, sex, temperament, illness, diet, climate, on the
formation of ideas and of moral affections.
If there are so many points of contact between the physical
and the moral being, it is because they rest on a common basis.
The operations called "moral," as well as the physical ones, result
directly from the action either of certain particular organs or of the
whole of the living system. All phenomena pertaining to intelli-
gence and will take their rise in the primitive or accidental state of
the organism as well as the other vital functions. The diversity of
functions is no reason why principles should be multiplied. As we
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do not assume a special principle for digestion, another for the
circulation of the blood, another for respiration, etc., neither must
we assume one for the intellectual functions. It is sufficient to
Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis.
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recognise that all functions, whether moral or physical, originate
in sensibility, a property common to all living organisms. Indeed,
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physical sensibility is, on the one hand, the utmost limit that we
reach in the study of the phenomena of life, and in the methodical
investigation of their connexion ; and it is also, on the other hand,
the most general principle discovered by the analysis of the intel-
lectual faculties and the affections of the soul. Thus the physical
and the moral life meet at their source, or, rather, the moral being
is but the physical being considered from certain special points of
view. The only principle of the phenomena of animal existence
is, therefore, the power of sensation. But what is the cause of this
power, what is its essence? Philosophers will not ask this ques-
tion. Sensibility is the universal fact in living nature. We cannot
get beyond it.
When Cabanis finds in his path any of Condillac's theories
that are incompatible with the results of his own researches, he
does not hesitate to reject them. Thus, Condillac maintained that
there are no psychological phenomena unperceived by conscious-
ness. Nothing, says Cabanis, is more contrary to experience. Al-
though it is a fact that the consciousness of impressions always
implies the existence and action of sensibility, the latter is, never-
theless, alive in many parts where the self nowise perceives its
presence; it nevertheless determines a great many important and
regular functions, though the self is not at all aware of its action.
There may be sensibility without sensation, i. e., without an im-
pression perceived.
Condillac said everything is acquired, even instinct. The par-
adox was bold, and Joseph de Maistre did not fail to laugh at it.
Cabanis looks upon instinct as innate, and infers therefrom that
external sensations are not, as Condillac declared, the sole prin-
ciple of all mental life. Moral ideas and determinations do not de
pend solely upon what are called sensations, that is, distinct impres-
sions received by the organs of the senses properly so called. The
impressions resulting from the functions of several internal organs
contribute to them more or less, and, in certain cases, appear to
be the sole cause of their production. There is within us a whole
system of inclinations and determinations formed by impressions
almost totally unconnected with those of the external world; and
these inclinations necessarily influence our way of considering ob-
jects, the direction of our researches concerning them, and our
judgment of them. It is not, therefore, the external world alone
that shapes the thoughts and desires of the ^^ self; it is rather the
latter, pre-formed by instinct and by specific dispositions, that
builds for itself an external world with the elements of reality that
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interest it. Likewise, spontaneous activity precedes in us reflec-
tive activity. We are first determined to act without being aware
of the means we employ, and often without even having conceived
a precise idea of the end we desire to attain.
The consideration of instinct naturally leads to that of final
causes. Cabanis admires the mutual dependency of all parts in
living bodies, and is not surprised that observers of nature "who
were not close thinkers" should have been deeply affected by it.
But in truth, these marvels are inseparable from the very organi-
sation of animals. One may recognise them, and even extol them
with all the magnificence of language, without being forced to ad-
mit in the causes anything that does not belong to the necessary
conditions of every existence. What seems to us finality is merely
the result of natural laws, inasmuch as they make possible the ap
pearance, propagation and permanence of living species; if this
ordering of parts which we think wonderful and intentional should
cease to exist, living beings would disappear. So that, even when
the naturalist has recourse to final causes, the philosopher cannot
without imprudence seek in them an argument in favor of beliefs
concerning the author of nature. But such reserve must be very
difficult to adhere to, since Cabanis, who recommends it, does not
himself observe it. In his Lettre a Fauriel sur les Causes Premieres
published after his death, Cabanis inclines toward a conception of
nature akin to that of the Stoics, in which ideas of order and final-
ity occupy a predominant place.
Cabanis has been widely read, and still deserves to be, were it
only for the abundance and the choice of the facts he brought to-
gether, the justness of most of his reflexions, and the pleasing ele-
gance of his style. His influence extended not only to philoso-
phers like Maine de Biran, Auguste Comte, H. Taine, but also to
novelists like Stendhal and his successors. Yet he has not escaped
the disrepute which overtook ideology. Metaphysics, reviving,
threw into the shade those philosophers who had thought it finally
banished. The ideologists had followed the way opened by the
encyclopaedists and the scientific men of the eighteenth century,
and were the first victims of a reaction which aimed higher than
at them.
The name given to the traditionalist philosophers exactly in-
dicates the position they assumed over against the eighteenth cen-
tury. To a body of doctrines, the common characteristic of which
was that they were based on the independent effort of individual
reason, they opposed a doctrine which discovered truth in tradi-
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tion, and particularly in tradition that is universally found among
men, viz., religious tradition. Shall we say that this is not a phil-
osophical doctrine, but the very negative of philosophy? Were
this true, such a negation was at least grounded on philosophical
reasons, that is to say, on a criticism of the opposing principles.
No doubt the traditionalists thought that they, as Christians, pos-
sessed the truth at the outset, before any discussion. But they,
nevertheless, meant to combat the "philosophers" on their own
ground, to unmask their sophistries, to refute their errors, and
finally to compel them, by sheer force of demonstration, to confess
the weakness of individual reason. De Bonald, De Maistre, the
two most illustrious representatives of this school, were looked
upon by all their contemporaries as formidable logicians, and, in
the judgment of Auguste Comte, for instance, De Maistre dealt the
philosophy of the eighteenth century some most telling blows.
Wherever this philosophy had seen "nature," De Bonald sees
"God." Nature to him is a vague and equivocal expression, and
cannot stand for a real cause. Nature is rather an effect, a system
of effects, a set of laws ; but these laws imply a legislator who
founded the system and who maintains it. The universe is un-
intelligible to him without a Creator who is at the same time a
Providence. Language, likewise, was attributed by the eighteenth
century philosophers (Rousseau excepted) to the invention of men.
This also is an untenable theory, all the more absurd as these phi-
losophers understood perfectly well that language is inseparable
from thought and social life. Men never could have invented lan-
guage had they not already lived in society; and they never could
have lived in society had they not already possessed language.
You cannot, De Bonald claims, get out of this circle unless you
admit this marvel—for language is no less marvellous than the or-
ganism of living beings—to be a gift from the Creator to rational
beings. And it is the same with all similar questions: the philos-
ophy of the eighteenth century looks back in the series of causes,
up to a certain point, where it stops, thinking it has reached the
fundamental principle; but this so-called principle explains noth-
ing, and must in its turn be explained. Religion alone, which is a
deeper sort of philosophy, attains to the first principle on which
all things depend.
Truth is therefore to be found in tradition. The pride of in-
dividual reason, which has despised this tradition, inevitably leads
to error. Even such a well-balanced mind as that of Montesquieu
did not escape it. All his theory of constitutions is false. Modern
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philosophy, says De Bonald, is the wisdom of man and not that of
society; that is to say, the wisdom of the depraved man and not
that of the social or perfect man; it tries to make the intelligent
man turn to natural religion. But this philosophical religion, the
pure worship of Divinity, of the Great Being, of the Being of Be-
ings, in a word, theism, infallibly leads to atheism, as the philo-
sophical government of political societies, the division and balance
of power in the state, or representative government, inevitably
leads to anarchy.
It is a mistake for man to assume the task of constituting so^.
ciety or establishing government. His intervention can only spoil
the work of Providence. It is society, on the contrary, which, being
founded on necessary relations, that is, relations established by
God, constitutes the individual man, and dictates the rules that
must govern his conduct.
The same leading ideas are expressed by Joseph de Maistre,
but with such eloquence and passion as to make them wonderfully
impressive. The eighteenth century, according to him, is one of the
most shameful epochs in the history of the human mind. Its phi-
losophy is a most degrading and fatal system. It has robbed rea-
son of her wings and made her grovel like a filthy reptile ; it has
dried up the divine source of poetry and eloquence, and caused all
the moral sciences to perish. And why did it produce these fright-
ful effects? Because this whole philosophy was nothing but a verit-
able system of practical atheism. To pronounce the name of God
in its presence would throw it into convulsions. It was the work
of the "Evil One," it was "the denying spirit," like Mephistoph-
eles. Moreover, according to De Maistre, the eighteenth century
merely applied to politics the principles of the Reformation, or, as
he says, of the "rebels" of the sixteenth century. The sixteenth
and the seventeenth centuries might be called the premises of the
eighteenth, which in fact was but the conclusion of the two pre-
ceding ones. "The human mind could not suddenly have risen to
such a pitch of audacity as we have witnessed. . . . Philosophism
could not have been erected except on the broad foundation of the
Reformation."
The hostility of De Maistre is clear-sighted, and he struck home
when he pointed out the inconsistency of those philosophers, who
praised so highly the experimental method, yet had not patience
enough to practise it, so anxious were they to substitute something
for the traditions they were pulling down. " It was a singularly
ridiculous trait of the eighteenth century to judge of everything
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according to abstract rules, without regard to experience ; and it
is the more strikingly ridiculous because this very century at the
same time kept continually sparring at all philosophers who took
abstract principles as their starting-point, instead of first looking
for them in the light of experience." Every one of the "philos-
ophers" in turn is roughly handled by De Maistre. I do not speak
Joseph De Maistre.
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only of Voltaire, against whom he feels a sort of fury which almost
overpowers him ; but Locke, whom the philosophers all hailed as
master, is no longer "the wise Locke," the "greatest of all phi-
losophers since Plato ; " he is a shart-sight&d, narrow-minded man,
not wicked, but simple, shallow, spiritless, a poor philosopher, a
mere pigmy beside the " Christi.an Plato^" that is, Malebranche
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who has been sacrificed to him. The infatuation of which he has
been the object is simply ludicrous. The same is said of Bacon,
whom De Maistre honors with a special indictment. His dislike is
no less for Condillac, "who sees the truth perfectly well, but who
had rather die than confess it ; " an odious writer, perhaps, that
one of all the philosophers of the eighteenth century who was most
on his guard against his own conscience.
These philosophers tried to persuade individual reason that it
was the sovereign judge of what is false and what is true, that the
progress of mankind depended upon that of the sciences, and that
ignorance and superstition were the causes of moral and social
evil. De Maistre denies all this as confidently as they asserted it.
He disparages reason as much as they exalted it. Reason, he de-
clares, stands manifestly convicted of incompetence as a guide for
men, for few men are in a fit state to reason well, and none can
reason well on all subjects; so that, generally speaking, it is advis-
able to begin with authority. "I do not mean to insult reason,'
says De Maistre, " I have infinite respect for it in spite of all the
wrong it has done us ; but whenever it stands in opposition to
common sense, we must put it from us like poison." And, indeed,
the general feeling of all men forms "a system of intuitive truths'
against which the sophistries of reason cannot prevail. It is a
"mysterious instinct" which we are bound to obey. This instinct
often guesses aright, even in the natural sciences ; it is almost in-
fallible in dealing with rational philosophy, ethics, metaphysics,
and natural theology, "and it is infinitely worthy of the supreme
wisdom, which created and regulated all things, to have enabled
man to dispense with science in all that most greatly concerns him."
Science ! that is the source from which proceed dangerous ex-
travagancies, rash self-assumption and proud blasphemy. Not that
it is bad in itself ; but it must be pursued only under certain in-
dispensable conditions. For want of this precaution the more
things our mind knows the more guilty it may be. Bacon is quite
" ludicrous " when he is provoked at scholasticism and theology.
Teach young people physics and chemistry before having imbued
them with religion and morality, and you will see the result. There
lurks in science, when it is not entirely subordinate to "national
dogmas," a something which tends to debase man and to make him
a useless or bad citizen. Science is not and ought not to be the
chief aim of the intelligence. Whence come, for instance, the mul-
tiplied complaints, and, one might say, revilings against Provi-
dence ? From this great phalanx of men called scientists, whom
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We have not in this century been able to keep in their proper place,
which is a subordinate one. In former times, there were very few
men of science, and among these few only a very small number
were impious. Now they are legion, and the exception has become
the rule. They have usurped a boundless influence. Yet it is not
for science to guide men. Nothing really essential is entrusted to
it. Science is an intellectual pastime, and in the material order of
things it is capable of useful applications; but there its domain
ends. "It belongs to the prelates, the nobles, the higher officers
of the state to be the depositories and guardians of saving truths,
to teach nations what is wrong and what is right, what is true and
what is false, in the moral and spiritual worlds. Others have no
right to reason on such matters. They have the natural sciences
to divert themselves with ; of what can they complain? As to the
man who speaks or writes in order to take away from the people a
national dogma, he ought to be hanged as one who robs the hearth
and home."
It would be difficult to carry the reaction against the favorite
ideas of the eighteenth century further. Yet De Maistre is in this
not merely obeying the desire to restore the rights of tradition and
religious authority and to abate the chimerical and sinful preten-
sions of such men as Helvetius and Condorcet. He founds his
opinion also on a conception of the universe and its relation to
God, which leaves to positive science but limited scope and range.
The world of visible phenomena and of the laws which regulate
them is a world of appearance and illusion which hides from our
sight the world of true and essential reality. Therefore, the closer
our science grasps phenomena and their laws, the farther it is,
with all its air of truth, from being really true ; or, at least, it is
only imperfectly and comparatively true, like the appearances which
are its object. The religious man who sees God everywhere in the
world ; the poet, moved by the beauty of the universe and by the
tragic character of human destiny; even the metaphysician who
discovers the invisible beneath the visible, are all three infinitely
nearer to truth, harmony, and the eternal substance, than the man
of science measuring and weighing atoms in his laboratory.
Consequently De Maistre has a constant tendency to explain
nothing by secondary causes, and always to appeal to mystery and
God's unfathomable designs. He gives an admirable description
of the struggle for life, and of the competition between living spe-
cies ; he sees clearly that war is a particular phase of this great
fact; but instead of seeking the cause, as Diderot or Darwin did,
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in the general laws of nature, he sees in it simply a "divine" laW,
and founds thereupon a whole theory of sacrifice. "The earth,
continually deluged with blood, is only an immense altar on which
all that has life must be slain, and that without end, or measure,
or rest, till the end of all things, till the death of death." He like-
wise insists upon the mutual responsibility of all the members of
one family, and of all the members of mankind, and upon the re-
versibility of penalties ; but instead of seeking the origin of these
beliefs in the constitution and religion of primitive societies, he
sees here again a "divine" law. The words superstition and
prejudice are to him meaningless. God's directing hand is every-
where in the world ; if we do not see it, it is because we refuse to do
so. A family is thought to be royal because it reigns; whereas,
on the contrary, it reigns because it is royal.
We shall not set forth here De Maistre's ideas on the spiritual
sovereignty of the Pope, the significance of the French Revolution,
and the constitution best suited for modern nations. We must lose
no time in returning to more properly philosophical doctrines. But
more than once, in these doctrines, shall we observe unquestion-
able traces which prove the influence of the chief traditionalists,
De Maistre, De Bonald, Ballandre and Lamennais. De Maistre,
especially, made upon many minds a deep and lasting impression.
Even if Auguste Comte had not formally acknowledged the fact,
his very doctrine would be sufficient to prove his indebtedness to
De Maistre for many of his historical, social, and religious ideas.
